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I Like To Pay Taxes:
Taxpayer Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System

By Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer 1
Draft of August 24, 2012
Please do not quote this draft without permission

Abstract
This paper is based on a simple proposition, which we believe but cannot prove: If
taxpayers support the way their tax dollars are spent, they are more likely to comply voluntarily
and less likely to change their behavior to avoid tax. To show that our claim is plausible, we
offer direct evidence from a literature involving experiments, draw on the more general
economics and psychology literature on prosocial behavior, and also invoke philanthropy as a
“real world” analogy; after all, charitable donors contribute money voluntarily (indeed, 2% of
the U.S. GDP), largely because they believe in the way their contributions are used.
Our claim has a number of concrete policy applications. The government should
publicize popular uses of tax dollars, and go to particular lengths to avoid the negative publicity
associated with waste. The government also should make broader use of taxes, like lotteries for
education and the social security tax, which are dedicated to specific (popular) spending
programs. In addition to proposing greater reliance on user fees, we offer a new justification for
subsidiarity – the idea that services should be provided by the lowest level of government
competent to do so – on the theory that taxpayers will feel more connected to a local or state
government’s activities and less inclined to free ride within a homogeneous local community.
We also suggest ways to adjust audit strategy and penalty structure to enhance prosocial
motivations. Furthermore, we urge the government to seek voluntary contributions from
taxpayers for programs they especially value. Finally, we explore the more controversial step of
allowing taxpayers to allocate some of their tax bill to programs they value, and conclude that,
at most, taxpayers should be permitted to do so only in a very limited way.
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"I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization." 2 Oliver Wendell Holmes

Why do people pay taxes? The simplest answer is that they have a legal obligation to do
so. But it has long been recognized that this legal obligation alone provides an inadequate
explanation for taxpaying behavior, 3 just as legal obligations generally offer an inadequate
explanation for most law-abiding activity. 4 Another answer, then, is that some people pay taxes
because – like Oliver Wendell Holmes – they like to do so. In other words, they appreciate that
the government provides a vast array of public goods, such as rule of law, roads, schools, and aid
to the poor, and find satisfaction in contributing to the public welfare.
This paper is based on a simple proposition, which we believe but cannot prove: that our
tax system will be more effective if taxpayers support the way their tax dollars are spent. We
believe they are more likely to comply voluntarily and less likely to change their behavior to
avoid tax. To show that our claim is plausible, we offer direct evidence from a literature
involving experiments. We also draw on the more general economics and psychology literature
on prosocial behavior – that is, the propensity to provide for public goods without any economic
reason for doing so. In addition, we invoke philanthropy as a “real world” analogy, since
charitable donors contribute money voluntarily (indeed, 2% of the U.S. GDP), 5 largely because
they believe in the way their contributions are used.
Our claim has a number of concrete policy applications. The government should
publicize popular uses of tax dollars, and go to particular lengths to avoid the negative publicity
associated with waste. The government also should make broader use of taxes, like lotteries for
education and the social security tax, which are dedicated to specific (popular) spending
programs. In addition to proposing greater reliance on user fees, we offer a new justification for
subsidiarity – the idea that services should be provided by the lowest level of government
competent to do so – on the theory that taxpayers will feel more connected to a local or state
government’s activities and less inclined to free ride within a homogeneous local community.
We also suggest ways to adjust audit strategy and penalty structure to enhance prosocial
motivations. Furthermore, we urge the government to seek voluntary contributions from
taxpayers for programs they especially value. Finally, we explore the more controversial step of
2

Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 71 (1961) (quoting Holmes).
James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and Europe, 27 J. ECON.
PSYCH. 224 (2006) [hereinafter Alm & Torgler, Cultural Differences]; James Alm & Benno Torgler, Estimating
the Determinants of Tax Morale, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 97TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION,
2004, MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.: NAT’L TAX ASSOC. 269-274 (2005) [hereinafter Alm & Torgler, Estimating].
Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 80-85 (2003).
4
TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); EDGAR ALLEN LIND & TOM TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
5
In 2011, charitable giving equaled 2.0% of GDP. See Giving USA 2012: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for
the Year 2011, Executive Summary 21 (chart).
3

allowing taxpayers to allocate some of their tax bill to programs they value, and conclude that, at
most, taxpayers should be permitted to do so only in a very limited way.
Before we continue, we want to avoid three potential misunderstandings. First, many of
our recommendations are “symbolic” in the sense that they would have at most a modest effect
on the way the government actually spends public money. Instead, our proposals focus on
providing taxpayers with information and on influencing their perceptions of the tax system. In
effect, we are positing that taxpayers have imperfect information about how their tax dollars are
spent and also, based on a large body of evidence, that they do not always behave rationally,
such that framing can influence behavior. As a result, we believe that “symbolic” gestures can
have real effects on the efficiency of taxation. A caveat is that we expect framing and
symbolism to have more influence on individuals than on businesses because of the fiduciary
duties managers owe to investors, and perhaps also because of the training and professional
norms of managers. As a result, our argument is less relevant to corporations and, likewise, to
investment funds and other sophisticated businesses taxed as pass through entities. More
generally, we recognize that behavioral effects can vary and are hard to predict but, in our view,
this does not make them any less important.
Second, we believe that deceiving taxpayers would be counterproductive. If the
deception ever comes to light, it would undermine the very prosocial impulses we are trying to
foster. Our recommendations aim to make the prosocial aspects of taxing and spending more
salient without deceiving taxpayers.
Third, we do not believe that framing will generally make taxpayers “like” paying taxes
(our title notwithstanding). Instead, the goal of the analysis is to make taxes less painful than
they currently are, enhancing the efficiency of taxation regardless of the baseline level of ill will
taxpayers bear for taxes.
Part I explains why the tax system is likely to be more effective if taxpayers support the
way their tax dollars are spent. Parts II and III offer institutional applications of this idea. Part
IV is the conclusion.
I.

Taxpayer Opinions About Spending and the Efficiency of Our Tax System

We begin by offering reasons why, in theory, our tax system should be more effective if
taxpayers support the way their money will be spent. We then show the plausibility of this claim
with three sources of empirical evidence: experimental studies on taxpayer responses to the way
their tax dollars are spent; the more general literature on prosocial behavior; and studies of
philanthropy. We then use polling data to show that taxpayer support for government spending
is weak, at least as measured in certain ways, so that there is significant room for improvement
on this dimension.
A. Reducing Enforcement Costs and Tax-Motivated Behavior

We begin by asking why it matters whether taxpayers support the way the government
spends their tax dollars. After all, taxes are mandatory. Taxpayers are legally obligated to pay
them, even if they do not like the way the government uses the money. Even so, there are two
reasons why we believe it still matters.
First, although taxes are legally mandatory, they are costly to enforce. A tax system will
be more legitimate and also more efficient if more people choose to pay voluntarily – that is, if
the tax system does not depend solely on muscular enforcement to extract taxes from an
unwilling population. It is better if taxpayers are motivated not just by fear of legal sanctions,
but also by support for the government and for the way the money is used. 6 At the margin, it
should take less effort and expense to ensure that they pay. Of course, in some contexts
enforcement is already so effective – withholding on wages, for instance – that our argument is
less relevant. 7 Yet in other settings – use taxes, nanny taxes, and cash businesses, for instance –
enforcement is so costly and impractical that those who pay these levies may feel as if they are
choosing to do so.
Second, if taxpayers support the way their tax dollars are spent, they may be less likely to
modify their behavior in a range of inefficient ways that would reduce their tax bill. Although
the existing literature on the subject focuses on compliance, we seek to broaden the lens. After
all, a wide range of taxpayer choices affect tax liability, including how much labor to supply,
how much to consume, how much to invest in legal tax avoidance strategies, and the like. If
taxpayers support the way their tax dollars are spent, this positive feeling could influence these
other choices as well. For example, taxpayers who like the public goods funded by their tax
dollars may be less likely to invest in a tax shelter. They may even work more than economists
suspect because they do not view the marginal tax burden caused by the additional labor as a
burden without any benefit. As a dollar of tax spent on a desirable public good becomes more
like a dollar of consumption, the tax becomes less distortive of decision-making.
B.

Experimental Literature on Taxpayer Responses to Uses of Tax Revenue

Yet is there any empirical evidence to support this argument? Are people really more
willing to pay taxes when they support how their tax dollars will be spent? Three experimental
studies suggest that, in fact, they are.
In a 1993 study, James Alm, Betty Jackson, and Michael McKee conducted a lab
experiment testing whether compliance rates rise when taxpayers support how their money will
6

Dan Kahan emphasizes that tax compliance is enhanced when taxpayers view their taxpaying as part of a
reciprocal arrangement. See generally Kahan, supra note 3. Many of our suggestions below are likely to enhance
the feelings of reciprocity associated with paying taxes.
7
For many taxpayers, opportunities for evasive behavior are curtailed by withholding and reporting systems. See
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Martin Knudsen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Soren Lonstrup Pedersen, and Emmanuel Saez,
Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651-692
(2011) (demonstrating that tax compliance is very high for Danish taxpayers subject to withholding and information
reporting systems).

be spent. They find a significant difference: the average compliance rate falls from .337 for a
popular use to .081 for an unpopular one. 8 As one participant noted, “My payments would be
lower if I disclosed less [i.e., if I cheated] but then the check to the Financial Aid Office [the
popular use] would be smaller.” 9 Compliance rates are also higher in their study when taxpayers
are consulted (through a majority vote) about how their money will be used. “[C]ompliance
suffers when individuals have no control over the use of their tax payments,” they conclude, and
“when their taxes pay for public goods that are unpopular.” 10 As a result, “government can
generate greater compliance by ensuring that individuals feel that they have a say in the manner
in which their taxes are spent, that citizens are well-informed of the outcome of the vote, and that
taxes are spent in ways consistent with the preferences of the citizens.” 11
In addition, two recent “real donation” experiments suggest that taxpayers will even give
voluntarily to the government if they support the way their money will be used. First, Li, Eckel,
Grossman and Brown test whether people are willing to contribute voluntarily to the government
and, if so, whether they donate more or less than to a charity pursuing a similar mission. The
study asks college students to make a series of choices (anonymously and voluntarily) in which
they allocate $20 either to themselves or to a specified organization. They are given pairs of
organizations – one a charity and the other a governmental organization – dedicated to the same
mission, which is either wildlife preservation, disaster relief, cancer research, or education. On
average, the subjects give 22 percent of their budgets to governments ($4.40 of $20); this is only
slightly lower than the 27% they gave to charity ($5.30 of $20). 12
In a second study, they show that subjects are more likely to give and also more generous
if allowed to choose a specific use for their donation. 13 Subjects are asked to make a series of
choices about how to allocate $20. Sometimes they are invited to donate to a general
government fund (“Gifts to the United States”), and sometimes to governmental agencies that
serve specific causes (National Cancer Institute Gift Fund or Corporation for National and
Community Service Disaster Relief Fund). They are also invited to donate to a general charity
(the United Way) or to a charity that serves a specific cause (American Cancer Society or
8

James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions, and Tax
Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGAN. 285, 298 (1993) (“The average compliance rate in IFC [when a popular
use, student financial aid, is imposed] is 0.228, and falls enormously to only 0.081 when the choice is both imposed
and unpopular in INC [an unpopular use, the University President’s office]”).
9
Id. at 301.
10
Id. at 301.
11
Id. at 301-302; see also Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., Taxpayer Attitudes Study: Final Report. Public
Opinion Survey Prepared for the Public Affairs Division (I.R.S., December, 1984); Quint C. Thurman, Craig St.
John & Lisa Riggs, Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving
Compliance to Tax Law, 6 LAW & POL’Y 309 (1984) (finding significant relationship between index measuring
objections to government spending and self-reported compliance and finding that attitudes about exchange
relationship with government affect compliance).
12
Tara Larson Brown, Catherine Eckel, Philip J. Grossman & Sherry Xin Li, Giving to Government: Voluntary
Taxation in the Lab, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1190 (2011).
13
Tara Larson Brown, Catherine Eckel, Philip J. Grossman & Sherry Xin Li, Do Earmarks Increase Giving to
Government? (CEEBS, Working Paper No. 8, 2011).

American Red Cross Disaster Relief Fund). When giving to the government, subjects are more
than twice as likely to give if a cause is specified (64% versus 30% of subjects) and their gifts
are nearly three-times as large on average ($4.78 out of $20 versus $1.68 out of $20). Giving to
charities is also more common and more generous if a cause is specified, although the
differential is smaller (74% versus 54% and $5.82 versus $3.69). “This suggests that people
value control over the use of their contributions,” Brown, Eckel, Grossman and Li conclude.
“When such control is lacking (e.g., the federal general fund or the United Way), people give
significantly less and are more likely to give zero.” 14
C. The Literature on Prosocial Behavior
These studies fit within a broader literature showing that people derive utility from
supporting public goods – a point that, if true, lends credibility to our claim. Indeed, economists
and psychologists have shown that, in a wide variety of settings, people free ride less than
economic theory would suggest. 15 The terms “prosocial behavior” and “prosocial utility” are
used to describe this unselfish instinct which leads people to care about the wellbeing of others. 16
1. Tax Morale
Some of this scholarship has been about tax enforcement: the “tax morale” literature
shows that U.S. taxpayers comply with the tax law at a higher rate than deterrence models would
predict. 17 Evidence suggests that most Americans pay what they owe even though most would
benefit economically from cheating on their taxes – since the expected savings would exceed
expected penalties, given imperfect enforcement. Indeed, in the United States, the IRS estimates
the voluntary compliance rate at 84%. 18 This compares favorably with compliance rates in many
other countries. 19
The tax morale literature offers several reasons why American comply so readily. A
“social norm” of compliance raises tax compliance rates, 20 as do perceptions of fairness in tax
14

Id.
For example, in a common laboratory experiment (the “dictator game”), people are given a sum of money and
asked to divide it between themselves and another player. They bear no economic consequence for keeping all of the
money for themselves. Across many different societies, people share some of the money with other players rather
than keeping it all for themselves as predicted by theories of rational self-interest. Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles,
Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Joseph Henrich & Richard McElreath, In Search of Homo Economicus:
Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73-78 (2001).
16
Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, Social Comparisons and Pro-Social Behavior: Testing ‘Conditional
Cooperation’ in a Field Experiment, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1717 3 (2004).
17
James Alm, G.H. McClelland & W.D. Schulze, Why Do People Pay Taxes? 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21 (1992); Lars P.
Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated, 3 ECON. OF GOVERNANCE 87 (2003).
18
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=158619,00.html.
19
See, e.g., James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe,
27 J. ECON. PSYCH. 234 (2006) (finding that tax morale in the United States is higher than in fifteen European
countries). See also Joel Slemrod, Trust in Public Finance, (NBER Working Paper 9187, 2002).
20
James Alm, Ana De Juan & Isabel Sanchez, Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48
KYKLOS 3-18 (1995).
15

administration, the perceived equity of government spending, overall levels of trust in the
government, 21 as well as ethical commitments, altruism, and patriotism. 22 Indeed, according to
Professors Alm and Torgler, who are leading figures in the tax morale literature, one reason why
taxpayers comply is that “[i]f taxpayers perceive that their preferences are adequately
represented and they are supplied with public goods, their identification with the state increases,
and thus the willingness to pay taxes rises.” 23
Admittedly, we should not overstate the precision of this literature. It suffers from a
reverse causation problem. While people who mistrust government may be less inclined to pay
taxes, people who are uninclined to pay taxes might also rationalize this impulse by invoking
their mistrust of government. 24 There are also omitted variable bias problems. Although we
know that Americans trust their government more than Greeks and also are more likely to pay
taxes, we cannot assume that one phenomenon is causing the other; instead, there may be yet
another factor (e.g., culture, religion, etc.) that encourages both. 25
2. Size and In-Group Effects
Other areas of the study of pro-social behavior – not specifically focused on tax – have
made more progress in establishing causal links between institutional features and pro-social
behavior. In his seminal treatment of the free rider problem and public goods provision,
Professor Olson famously argued that smaller groups will have an easier time overcoming the
free rider problem than larger groups. 26 Many papers provide some degree of support for this
hypothesis. 27

21

Ronald G. Cummings, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Michael McKee & Benno Torgler, Effects of
Culture on Tax Compliance: A Cross Check of Experimental and Survey Evidence, (Ctr. for Research in Economics,
Management and the Arts, Working Paper No. 2004-13); Alm & Torgler, Cultural Differences, supra note 3.
22
See generally Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes
or Complements? 50 J. ECON. LIT. (draft of Sept 2011).
23
Id. at 243.
24
Iris Bohnet & Stephan Meier, Deciding to Distrust, in PUBLIC POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER 05-4, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, at 10 (2005).
25
Field experiments can be designed to avoid these flaws, but the results do not always seem perfectly consistent.
For instance, one experiment shows that taxpayers who are told that compliance rates are higher than they might
have expected will claim fewer deductions. See Michael Wenzel, Misperception of Social Norms About Tax
Compliance: A Field Experiment (Ctr. for Tax System Integrity, Working Paper No. 8, 2001), cited in Frey &
Meier, supra note 16. Another, by contrast, shows that simple normative appeals to taxpayers asking for compliance
have little causal effect on taxpaying behavior. See Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Taxpayer
Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence From a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB.
ECON. 455-483 (2001).
26
Mancur Olson, Jr. The Logic Of Collective Action: The Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965). In the
extreme, people will free ride in small groups just as they do in large groups. So long as the public benefits of a
public good contribution exceed the private benefits, then there should be free riding and underprovision. Smaller
groups may be better at designing mechanisms to overcome this problem, however. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
27
See R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, Communication and Free Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contributions
Mechanism, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 585 (1988); R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, Group Size Hypotheses of Public

Experimental evidence also demonstrates that individuals are more likely to contribute to
public goods when the beneficiaries are members of the same “group.” 28 Subjects who are
randomly assigned to one group are more likely to cooperate with other group members than
with individuals randomly assigned to another group. 29 Observational studies reinforce this
laboratory evidence, showing that redistribution, 30 willingness to participate in social
organizations, 31 and public goods provision all decrease as ethnic diversity increases.
3. Moral Engagement
Prosocial behavior can also be encouraged or discouraged by institutional context,
inspiring either self-interest or so-called “moral engagement.” This explains the famously
counterintuitive finding that parents are more likely to pick up children late from daycare if they
are fined for doing so. The fine inspires them to view overtime childcare as a service to be
purchased, rather than as a boorish imposition on the community. 32 By contrast, if a fine is not
seen as a price, but as a penalty for breaching community norms, people are less likely to incur
it. 33 A long literature seeks to document when economic incentives, such as fines, serves as
“substitutes” for prosocial incentives, as in the childcare example, versus when economic
incentives “complement” prosocial incentives. 34
D. The “Real World” Case Study of Philanthropy
So far, we have offered reasons why taxpayers are more likely to comply with the tax
law, and less likely to change their behavior inefficiently to avoid paying, if they support the way
their tax dollars are used. To show the plausibility of this claim, we have cited different aspects
of the economics and psychology literature on prosocial behavior.

Goods Provision: An Experimental Examination, 103 Q. J. ECON. 179 (1988); R. Mark Isaac, James M. Walker, &
Arlington Williams, Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing
Very Large Groups, 54 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1991); James Andreoni & Rachel Croson, Partners Versus Strangers:
Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMIC RESULTS (2008).
28
Even a seemingly trivial group identifier (preference for the artist Kandinsky over Klee or vice versa) inspires
people to behave in a more prosocial manner. HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1981).
29
Lorenz Goette, David Huffman, and Stephan Meier, The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm
Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006 at 212-216.
30
Erzo Luttmer, Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution, 109 J. POL. ECON. 500‒528 (2001).
31
Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, Participation in Heterogeneous Communities, 115
Q. J. ECON. 847‒904 (2000).
32
Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (fines for daycare in Haifa caused
people to think the fine was a price).
33
For example, fines for using plastic bags have been even more effective than self-interest would predict, since
they are viewed as reinforcing a community’s moral commitment. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Motivated by Tax, Irish
Spurn Plastic Bags, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2008. (fines for plastic bags in Ireland was a signal about moral /
community norms); Patricia Funk, Is There An Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws
with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 135 (2007) (lifting fine on not voting lead to less voting).
34
Bowles & Polonia Reyes, supra note 22.

Yet perhaps the most telling evidence that people give money if they support how it will
be used is the charitable sector. Millions of people give time and money to charity every day.
Charitable giving represents 2% of U.S. GDP and individuals across the income spectrum make
charitable contributions. 35
1. Why People Give: The Literature on Altruism and Warm Glow
In explaining why donors give to charity, the literature on philanthropy emphasizes, not
surprisingly, that donors believe in the way their money is being used – a close analogy for our
claim about the tax system. The focus of this literature is on two different prosocial motivations:
altruism and warm glow. 36
“Altruism” means that individuals derive utility from providing goods that can be
enjoyed by others (public goods). While altruism’s connection to philanthropy is obvious, there
are two reasons why altruism is not a complete explanation for charitable giving. First, if donors
care only about the overall supply of a public good, they should reduce their giving, dollar for
dollar, by the amount funded by the government. 37 Yet the empirical evidence contradicts this
prediction. Government funding does not “crowd out” charitable giving to the degree predicted
by theories relying on altruism. 38 Second, if giving is motivated solely by altruism, a small
number of wealthy individuals should be the exclusive givers of every type of charity. 39 The
reason is that altruistic donors would give when the benefit of spending a dollar on a public good
outweighs the benefit to them of spending another dollar on a private good, and wealthy
individuals derive less benefit from another increment of private goods. Yet although wealthier
individuals do give more in absolute dollars, they do not give more as a percentage of income. 40

35

See Giving USA, supra note 5. The non-profit sector produced about 5.4% of GDP in 2010. See The Urban
Institute, Non-Profits, available at http://www.urban.org/nonprofits/index.cfm.
36
James Andreoni, Charitable Giving, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 748 (Lawrence E. Blume &
Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2007).
37
See James Andreoni, Philanthropy, in HANDBOOK OF GIVING, RECIPROCITY AND ALTRUISM, 1201, 1221
(Serge-Christophe. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier eds., 2006) (summarizing crowding out hypothesis). See Peter G.
Warr, Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity, 19 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 131 (1982)
(developing theory of neutrality in which government contributions crowd out charity on a dollar-for-dollar basis).
38
See, e.g., Burton A. Abrams & Mark D. Schmitz, The “Crowding Out” Effect of Government Transfers on Private
Charitable Contributions, 33 PUB. CHOICE 29 (1978) (offering empirical analysis showing that for every dollar of
government support, there is a decline of 28 cents in private contributions); David C. Ribar & Mark O. Wilhelm,
Altruism & Joy-of-Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior,110 J. POL. ECON. 425, 444 (2002) (offering empirical
support for fact that charity is motivated by joy of giving and not altruism, as there is very little evidence of crowd
out; private giving declines by only 23 cents for every dollar of government spending and by only 8 cents for every
dollar of spending by a charity with a similar mission, analyzing database from 1986 to 1992 involving database of
125 organizations that give foreign aid). There is experimental evidence too. See Andreoni, supra note 37, at 1223
(offering citations).
39
James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON.
J. 464, 465 (1990).
40
To be more concrete, consider a moderate income individual who deplores the idea of others going hungry. If the
government got into the hunger avoidance business, that individual should give less. Similarly, she should give a

Since altruism does not fully account for patterns of giving, economists invoke a second
type of prosocial behavior known as “warm glow,” which means that individuals give to charity
– not only because they value a particular public good – but also because they want to be the one
providing it. Having someone else, like the government, provide the good is not the same as
being its source.
Warm glow is a powerful motivation for charitable giving, and we believe there is an
analogous motivation when people pay taxes to support initiatives they value. Admittedly this
would not be the case if warm glow arises only from voluntary giving. Is the key to warm glow
that you choose to be the source of the funds, or just that you are the source of the funds?
Although the literature on philanthropy does not address this question, we believe it is plausible
to think that variations of warm glow could arise with mandatory payments as well.
2. Strategies to Encourage Charitable Giving
Our goal in this Article is not only to suggest that taxpayers are more likely to pay their
taxes if they support the way their tax dollars are used, but also to help policymakers take
advantage of this insight through better institutional design. In this spirit, it is worth surveying
various ways in which nonprofits encourage giving.
a. Sympathy for the Cause
Not surprisingly, fundraisers seek to persuade potential donors of the value of their cause.
They publicize their successes and seek to show that they are pursuing their mission efficiently.
In asking for support, many charitable campaigns emphasize specific goals that their fundraising
will achieve – addressing a particular crisis, financing a new building, and the like.
Relatedly, nonprofits invite donors to choose what they want to support, so that donors
are paired with initiatives matching their preferences. 41 Some donors to a law school, for
example, support financial aid, while others support faculty research, public interest programs,
curricular initiatives, or building projects. Giving donors a choice also gives them a greater
sense of ownership, so that they feel personally invested in the cause they are supporting.
b. Financial Incentives

lower percentage of her income to combatting hunger than a wealthier individual with the same commitment to the
cause. As long as enough wealthy individuals in the population support hunger avoidance, the moderate income
individual should give nothing. Yet moderate income individuals give to charity at rates comparable to much
wealthier citizens. See http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/124xx/doc12480/10-18-charitableTestimony.pdf, at 6
(demonstrating that households with adjusted gross income below $50,000 give slightly greater than two percent of
adjusted gross income to charity, while households with $200,000-$500,000 give less than 2.5% of adjusted gross
income to charity).
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In addition, many campaigns involve “matching” grants, which promise that, for each
dollar raised from a donor, an additional “matching” grant will come from another donor. Why
should charitable campaigns be organized this way? It would be far simpler for each donor to
contribute separately. In addition, if charitable giving is motivated by altruism alone, matching
gifts would be counterproductive, since they would motivate potential donors to free ride. Yet
this has not been the experience of fundraisers, presumably because matching inspires warm
glow. When our donations are matched, we feel as if we are responsible for even more giving –
not just what we personally give, but also the match triggered by our gift. Indeed, a field
experiment by Karlan and List finds that the offer of a matching grant increases charitable giving
by approximately 19%. 42
c. Recognition, Shaming
Likewise, giving is encouraged through recognition. People are encouraged to give in
order to have their names on a building or scholarship, to be included on a list of donors, or to
serve on a board. The literature sometimes describes this sort of reputational motivation as a
form of “extended self-interest.” 43
E. Lack of Confidence in Government Spending: The Bleak Picture from Polling
Data
So far, we have offered a theory about why taxpayer views on the way tax dollars are
spent could affect the efficiency of the tax system. Although we cannot prove our theory
definitively, we have sought to establish its plausibility by drawing on the literature on pro-social
behavior and philanthropy. This literature offers evidence that people contribute to the
community not only because they have to do so, but also because they want to do so.
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If we are correct that people are more likely to pay their taxes if they believe in what the
government is doing, there is reason to be concerned about the current state of American public
opinion. Tax morale may be higher than in other countries, as noted above, but polls show that,
unfortunately, taxpayer confidence in the way the U.S. government spends money is weak, and
getting weaker. According to a 2011 Gallup poll, Americans believe the Federal government
wastes 51 cents of every dollar it spends. This is the highest estimate on record, which is 11
cents more than in 1979 when the first poll on the subject was taken. 44
It is also sobering that Americans do not seem to connect the taxes they pay with the
services they receive from the government. For example, a majority of Americans believe they
get less in government benefits and services than they are paying in taxes, even at a time when
government spending dramatically exceeds tax revenue by almost 10% of the GDP. 45 Similarly,
surveys about the Bush tax cuts showed that people who favored more spending on specific
government programs were, ironically, more likely to support the tax cuts. 46 Likewise,
Americans generally endorse “spending cuts” in the abstract as a way to reduce the federal
deficit, 47 but they consistently oppose cuts in specific government programs. According to a
2012 N.Y. Times article about a conservative county in Minnesota:
Support for spending cuts runs strong in Chisago . . . . But the reality of life here is
that [residents of the county] continue to take as much help from the government as
they can get. When pressed to choose between paying more and taking less, many
people interviewed here hemmed and hawed and said they could not decide. Some
were reduced to tears. 48
As Larry Bartels has observed, “Survey results . . . make it clear that most ordinary citizens are
remarkably ignorant and uncertain about the workings of the tax system and the policy options
under consideration, or actually adopted, in Washington.” 49
The silver lining here, of course, is that there is significant room for improvement.
Americans clearly do support specific government programs. But they seem not to associate the
44
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taxes they pay with the programs they like. One implication, of course, is for the government to
focus its spending more on initiatives that are likely to attract popular support. Another
implication, which is the focus of this Article, is that the government should make a more
concerted effort to educate taxpayers about how their tax dollars are spent and to encourage them
to associate tax payments more directly with government initiatives they favor. The question,
though, is how to do this.

II.

Applications: Accentuating the Positive and Eliminating the Negative

We have argued that taxpayers are more likely to pay their taxes – and less likely to
change labor, savings, and other decisions for tax-motivated reasons – if they support the way
their taxes will be used. If we are right, how should our tax system change? How can we
encourage taxpayers to experience warm glow and other prosocial motivations in paying taxes?
The overriding goal is to encourage taxpayers to associate taxes with programs they support and,
correspondingly, to minimize the extent to which they associate taxes with government
expenditures they oppose. As the old song goes, “accentuate the positive” and “eliminate the
negative.” 50
This Part offers examples of how to pursue this goal. We begin with efforts to focus
taxpayer attention on popular programs and to avoid waste, and then consider the value of
formally linking taxes with specific programs, whether through dedicated taxes or user fees. We
also argue that the degree of taxpayer warm glow can be influenced – not only by how we
structure taxes – but also by the level of government that collects them, and by the way penalties
and audits are structured.
Before proceeding, we should offer a caveat. While it is easy to say that we should
emphasize popular programs and deemphasize unpopular ones, an obvious challenge is that our
country is diverse, even polarized. Programs that appeal to some will be resented by others. In a
sense, one person’s warm glow is another’s cold shower. In response, the government can look
for ways to pair taxpayers with initiatives they personally value. In effect, this strategy is to
segment taxpayers, so that individuals are supporting (or at least are focusing on) different
initiatives. We return to this sort of choice-based approach – which, as we shall see, is more
controversial – in Part III.
A. Prosocial Benefits from Publicizing Popular Government Activities
Positive publicity for government spending can promote warm glow among taxpayers.
By analogy, charitable organizations frequently trumpet their accomplishments to inspire warm
glow, describing their activities in magazines, mailings, emails and tweets. They market their
50
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missions with phrases connecting donor support with concrete achievements such as, “for the
price of your daily latte, you can feed a child.”
Governments should (and do) engage in similar trumpeting – in signs about “your tax
dollars at work,” in press releases from politicians about benefits secured for constituents, and
the like. Although political scientists generally dismiss these expenditures as inefficient “credit
claiming” by politicians eager for reelection, the prosocial perspective suggests that this publicity
has value in two related respects if it enhances warm glow. 51
First, the government can help taxpayers derive satisfaction from paying taxes by
showing they receive value for their money. 52 For example, the government can run an
advertising campaign in which respected celebrities highlight popular government programs and
urge viewers to take pride in paying taxes, perhaps modeled on Clint Eastwood’s Super Bowl
halftime commercial for General Motors. In addition, an image of the American flag can appear
on tax forms and software, along with slogans like “Support our Troops” and marketing
materials to remind taxpayers of programs they support. In this spirit, the Obama Administration
has added a “Federal Taxpayer Receipt” to the White House Website; taxpayers enter the amount
of taxes they paid, and the website specifies how much of their money was spent on “national
defense, health care, job and family security, education and job training,” and other spending
program. 53 Likewise, the IRS could require all tax preparation software to include a similar
feature and could even require it to be filed with the return.
Second, by connecting tax payments with programs valued by taxpayers, the government
should aspire to promote moral engagement, so that taxpayers are motivated by ethical
commitments instead of bargaining when making decisions about taxes. 54 Indeed, positive
publicity about the government’s work may enhance tax morale and improve compliance. As
filing deadlines approach, the IRS already issues press releases describing enforcement
measures. 55 They should also give examples of taxpayers who made voluntary contributions to
the government beyond what they owe. In this spirit, the Indian government publicized the fact
51
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that a popular film star paid the highest tax bill in the nation. 56 Indeed, a number of studies show
that stories about pro-social behavior of peers engender compliance more effectively than threats
of sanctions. 57
Yet we do not mean to paper over the difficulties in implementing this strategy or to
overstate its effectiveness. One challenge is cost – or, to be more precise, perceived cost. If
taxpayers believe the government is overspending on publicity, it will not have the intended
effect. Publicity efforts should thus be taken up slowly and carefully.
A further challenge – and, indeed, a recurring theme in this Article – is the need to be
mindful of the diversity of taxpayer opinion, and to target messages accordingly. This is not
especially different from the efforts of advertisers to segment the market. For example, the
messages for urban and rural areas or for “red” and “blue” states might be different, just as
political campaigns emphasize different themes in different media markets.
Another complication is that government officials who oppose a particular initiative will
use publicity to portray it in a negative light, and this negative publicity could undermine
taxpayer warm glow. Regardless of its effect on warm glow, this sort of opposition is an essential
feature of our democratic system and must be permitted. But it is worth emphasizing that
negative publicity will not necessarily undermine warm glow and sometimes can enhance it. On
one hand, if the negative publicity is unpersuasive to taxpayers, it may prove harmless. On the
other hand, if it is extremely persuasive – so that the program is terminated – the net effect of this
publicity might be to enhance warm glow, for instance, by increasing the percentage of public
money devoted to popular programs, and by reinforcing the conviction of taxpayers that the
government is responsive to their concerns.
B. Avoiding Government Waste
Just as the government should remind taxpayers that their tax dollars support programs
they value, the government should also make particular efforts to avoid reminding them of
government activities they dislike. For this reason, waste has unique implications for the
government. After all, a dollar wasted by a for-profit firm producing a private good does not
impact consumer utility. Consumers do not change their view of the product. They still buy it if
the product’s benefits outweigh its costs (and not otherwise). 58 The costs of this waste are borne
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– not by consumers – but by the for-profit firm’s residual claimants, who should (and do) expend
funds to avoid waste. Yet with government waste, taxpayers as a group are the residual
claimants. A dollar of waste costs taxpayers one dollar. As a result, taxpayers (unlike consumers)
should (and do) expend funds to limit waste, for instance, through ombudsman and the many
inspectors general of government agencies.
At first glance, the expenditure rule for waste-reducing-activities by the government
appears simple: a dollar spent on waste reduction should reduce waste by at least a dollar. 59
Spending on waste reduction beyond this level is inefficient, costing more than it yields.
But this rule ignores the possibility of prosocial utility from government spending. For
instance, people may feel warm glow in paying taxes, knowing they are supporting important
public goods. Yet government waste is likely to dim this warm glow. This perspective is
familiar to charities, which are often ranked on how efficiently they turn contributions into
public goods. Therefore, money spent on reducing waste – whether in nonprofits or in
government – produces value from two sources. It reduces waste directly, and it prevents the
reduction in prosocial utility. As a result, the government should devote even more resources
than a private firm to avoiding waste. 60
In making this point, we recognize that waste is not a self-defining term, and that what
some consider waste might be a worthwhile initiative to others. Yet some expenditures will
offend even those who sympathize with the goal being pursued. For instance, even the most
ardent proponent of military spending will not want the military to pay $500 for a wrench.
Likewise, even those who recognize the importance of managing the government’s buildings
will doubt the need to spend $800,000 on a lavish Las Vegas conference for General Services
Administration employees. 61
C.

Taxes with Dedicated Uses

If the conventional wisdom is correct that public goods should be provided until their
marginal cost (in direct terms and possibly from the distortions caused by taxation) equals their
total marginal benefit (including direct benefit and redistribution), then it makes no sense for the
government to specify how it will spend a particular tax. For example, why would it matter
whether the proceeds of a government-sponsored lottery will support schools, as opposed to tax
enforcement? The marginal costs of the lottery should not depend in any way on the marginal
benefit associated with schools. In addition, in requiring particular taxes to fund only specified
59
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programs, we lose the flexibility to redirect tax dollars as conditions change. All else being
equal, the government obviously should want this flexibility.
Yet in our view, all else is not equal, so that explicitly linking a tax with a popular
government program adds value that must be factored into the analysis. Obviously, specifying
how a tax will be spent can build political support for it. For example, although the conventional
wisdom is that a higher gas tax is politically unattainable in the United States, some
commentators speculate that President Bush could have persuaded Congress to enact one
immediately after September 11, 2001 to fund defense against further attacks.
Similarly, although there is no economic reason why social security has to be funded
through a separate tax – a point that President Roosevelt’s advisors urged on him – there is a
powerful political reason. As FDR explained,
I guess you are right on the economics, but those taxes were never a
problem of economics. They are politics all the way through. We put those
payroll taxes there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right
to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes in
there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program. 62
Our point is that this sort of linkage is relevant not only to politics, but also to welfare.
As noted above, if taxpayers support the way a tax will be spent, they might work less hard to
avoid it, due to the prosocial utility associated with paying the tax. Indeed, studies show that
taxpayers are more likely to buy state lotteries tickets when the proceeds are dedicated to
education, instead of the state’s general revenue. 63 Likewise, surveys suggest that taxpayers are
more willing to pay environmental taxes if the proceeds are used to fund environmental
programs. 64
Linking a tax to a popular spending program is especially helpful with taxes that are easy
to avoid. For example, if state governments dedicate use taxes to a popular cause, such as
feeding hungry children, they might see an increase in collections. Taxpayers will be especially
motivated if they believe that paying this tax will increase the resources available to hungry
children.
The government’s commitment to use a tax to fund a particular cause must be credible in
order to persuade taxpayers to raise their level of compliance. In theory, of course, all that
matters is for taxpayers to believe that their tax dollars are being used to advance a popular
62
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public goal – even if, in fact, this is not the case. If the government announces that use taxes will
fund meals for hungry children – when, in fact, they will be used for a different purpose – in the
short run the government might inspire some taxpayers to pay taxes they would not otherwise
have paid. But in the long run, when the real facts emerge, this effect will be reversed with a
vengeance. Government credibility will be eroded, so that this sort of initiative will be harder to
pursue in the future.
As noted above, a further challenge with this sort of strategy is the reality that, in a
diverse society, taxpayers have heterogeneous preferences. Expressly linking a tax with a
particular goal will encourage supporters of the goal to pay the tax, but it could have the opposite
effect on opponents. For example, supporting religious instruction in public schools or longer
incarceration for drug offenders is likely to inspire some taxpayers, while alienating others. In
general, this strategy should be used only for public goals that attract broad support, such as
social security, health care, and education. 65
D. User Fees
Many government-provided public goods can be funded through either general revenues
or more targeted user fees. For example, roads are generally financed with gasoline taxes, but
sometimes they are funded with tolls. Public goods that can be funded via fees or tolls are called
“excludible,” because the government can exclude those who do not pay the toll from benefiting
from the public good. Even more than taxes with dedicated uses, user fees and licenses link
government revenue and taxpayer benefits.
Should the government fund excludible public goods via general revenues or fees and
tolls? The conventional analysis points out that tolls and user fees lead to inadequate provision of
public goods. If there is no marginal cost associated with using the good (e.g., a car on an empty
road imposes a near zero marginal cost), then charging a user fee leads to suboptimal use of the
public good. Likewise, to the extent we want not only to fund public goods but also to
redistribute wealth through our tax system, it is harder to do through user fees (unless, for
instance, the size of the fee is adjusted for income).
Yet in our view, this analysis is incomplete. Charging user fees allows the government to
reduce income taxes. In addition, user fees are viewed like any other price. They do not distort
labor or leisure decisions because the user gets the full benefit of the spending. (This is true even
without prosocial motivations). As a result, user fees reduce the inefficiency associated with
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income taxation. Governments should weigh this reduction in deadweight loss against the
suboptimal use that user fees engender.
At the same time, a potential concern about user fees is that they might affect taxpayer
attitudes toward the other taxes they pay. If taxpayers pay separate fees and tolls for all public
services that are salient to them, they might develop a less favorable view of income taxes, since
they might become less likely to associate these tax payments with public services that they
personally experience and value. Such an effect would offset the efficiency benefits of lower
taxation enabled by widespread use of user fees and tolls.
E. Subsidiarity
If taxpayers are more accepting of taxes funding public goods that are more immediate
and salient, this insight has implications not only for the type of taxes we collect – for instance,
dedicated taxes or user fees – but also for the level of government that should collect them. We
believe that state and local taxes have three advantages over national government.
First, the public goods provided by lower levels of government are likely to be more
salient, so that taxpayers are more likely to associate them with the taxes they pay. Second, and
relatedly, taxpayers may feel as if they have more of a say in what their local government does,
so that they feel more invested in the public goods being pursued with their tax dollars. Third, if
taxpayers identify especially closely with their local communities, they might be less inclined to
free ride at their expense; indeed, observational and experimental studies consistently
demonstrate that smaller and more homogeneous groups have an easier time sustaining prosocial
behavior than larger and more diffuse populations. 66
Each of these reasons – the salience of the public goods, the readier access to the
decisionmaking process, and the homogeneity of the communities – suggest that taxes are more
likely to be efficient if collected locally, instead of nationally. Our theory about the connection
between taxes and spending, therefore, offers a new justification for subsidiary, i.e., the principle
that that public goods should be delivered and funded by the lowest feasible level of governance.
There is some empirical support for this theory, for instance, in studies of Swiss cantons showing
that more local autonomy is associated with significantly higher tax morale. 67
Obviously, there already are a host of other arguments for subsidiarity and federalism in
the literature. 68 For example, subsidiarity allows greater oversight of public goods provision, 69
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enables spending to be tailored to tastes, 70 encourages experimentation, 71 and leads to healthy
competition between jurisdictions for residents. 72 These familiar theories focus more on the
quality of local spending, as opposed to local tax collection. While we are breaking new ground
in focusing on tax collection, the two obviously are connected. After all, if local spending is
indeed more efficient, as Tiebout models contend, then taxpayers may well experience more
warm glow in supporting it.
Needless to say, there are a number of countervailing considerations that favor higher
levels of government, including economies of scale, the need to minimize free-riding by one
jurisdiction on another, greater possibilities for redistribution of wealth, and the like. Our goal is
not to offer a comprehensive analysis – all the more so because the analysis has to be contextspecific – but to highlight an additional advantage of subsidiary that has not been emphasized in
the literature: the relative advantage that lower levels of government have in generating warm
glow in tax collection.
F. Fines, Rewards, and Audits
Our analysis has implications not only for which level of government should collect a
tax, but also for how penalty and audit strategies should be crafted. We want taxpayers to view
cheating as a breach of a moral and civic duty, and not as a wager where fines are the price of
losing. So although we obviously need audits and sanctions to provide economic incentives for
compliance, we do not want these incentives to “crowd out” prosocial motivations. 73 Therefore,
we should strive to structure audits and penalties – and, more generally, to calibrate enforcement
– in ways that minimize crowding out.
This obviously is a very broad topic, and our goal is not to offer a specific proposal or a
comprehensive analysis. Indeed, we do not claim to know precisely what will work. A
challenge is that taxpayer motivations for compliance are heterogeneous, as Alex Raskolnikov
has emphasized. 74
Yet a clear lesson that emerges from the literature on prosocial behavior is that context
matters. As a result, the government should experiment with various approaches to identify
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context-specific institutional strategies that promote prosocial motivations. For example, if the
government compensates taxpayers for the costs of a random audit, as Joseph Bankman has
suggested, 75 the government would signal a desire to be fair, which, hopefully, would inspire
taxpayers to reciprocate. 76 Likewise, we may want to reward taxpayers if their audit shows that
they have paid in full, since rewards are sometimes more effective than penalties at triggering
prosocial motivations. 77 In the same spirit, a range of sanctions can be explored for
noncompliance, including not just cash payments, which are the most likely to crowd out
prosocial motivations and may even signal that noncompliance is acceptable so long as the noncomplier pays for the privilege, 78 but also community service requirements, mandatory civics
courses, and the like. These steps are thought to “crowd out” less and may even “crowd in.” 79
To sum up, then, if a novel approach can change the frame by which taxpayers view our
compliance system, the benefits would be large. It could lead to “crowding in”, so that the
incentive complements and reinforces prosocial motivations. 80
III.

Applications: Taxpayer Choice

While the government should publicize popular programs and dedicate particular taxes to
fund them, as discussed above, a significant challenge in doing so is the diversity of taxpayer
opinion. Taxpayers are likely to disagree about the merits of a particular program, such that
highlighting it is a mixed blessing.
Charities do not face this problem to the same degree, since affiliating with a charity is
voluntary. Indeed, the freedom to choose what to support is inherent in philanthropy. By
analogy, can we give taxpayers some measure of freedom to choose what they want to support?
After all, pairing taxpayers with initiatives they support can promote prosocial utility within a
diverse population. Some can support the troops, while others can support the schools, and so
on. Borrowing from philanthropy, we may also want to recognize taxpayer support with
matching gifts, naming rights, and the like.
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Yet such choices are more complicated for government than for charity, since
government is inherently a communitarian enterprise. As a result, a problem with choice-based
strategies is that they may be in tension with other important values. The degree of tension –
and, of course, the extent of the benefit – depend on the specifics of how a choice-based strategy
is structured.
This Part begins by outlining potential benefits and costs that can arise with choice-based
approaches. We then discuss two examples that balance costs and benefits somewhat differently.
First, taxpayers can be allowed to allocate only voluntary contributions that are in excess of what
they are obligated to pay in taxes (which we call “allocating voluntary payments”), either by
contributing to independent nonprofits affiliated with the government or to the government itself.
Second, and more controversially, they can be permitted to allocate even a portion of taxes they
are legally obligated to pay (which we call “allocating mandatory payments”).
A. Normative Tradeoffs
1. Potential Benefits
Obviously, the main reason to offer taxpayers this sort of discretion is to focus taxpayer
attention on the segment of expenditures that they especially value, thereby increasing prosocial
attitudes towards paying taxes and, hopefully, reducing enforcement costs, tax planning costs,
and the like.
In theory, taxpayers could be invited to fund initiatives that are quite specific. To make
the program more administrable, though, the government can offer only a menu of broadlydefined options, such as “support for our troops,” “education and job training,” “crime
prevention and law enforcement,” “health care,” “the national debt,” and the like. By facilitating
this sort of taxpayer choice, we would match individuals with programs they find appealing,
thereby reminding them that taxes fund initiatives they value.
In addition, as in the nonprofit world, taxpayers can be recognized for supporting
particular programs (unless they request anonymity). For example, they can be included on a list
of donors posted on a website. If it is administratively feasible to do so, they should also be
given details about how their money was used. For instance, just as donors to financial aid at a
university are given information about the student they are supporting, taxpayers who chose to
support our troops can be given the name of the soldier who is being funded by their
contributions.
In addition to encouraging prosocial motivations among taxpayers, a further potential
advantage of a choice-based initiative is that it can generate useful information. Policymakers
will learn what taxpayers support most enthusiastically. After all, the way people spend money
is a meaningful indication of what they value – in ways, more meaningful than opinion polls. If
our political process is functioning properly, the budget should track, at least in a rough way, the

distribution of preferences among taxpayers. If it does not, then that is information our
legislators should have. It also should be disclosed, so the media and voters will have this
information as well.
2. Potential Costs
However, there obviously are administrative costs associated with implementing this
idea. In addition, there are six other potential concerns, which might – or might not – arise,
depending upon the details of what taxpayers are permitted to do.
First, while taxpayers may feel more enthusiasm for the payments they are permitted to
allocate, there is a risk that they will feel correspondingly less enthusiasm for the rest of what
they pay the government. If they associate this residual with programs they did not choose – and
do not support – they will find it less fulfilling to make this residual payment. There is an
analogy here to the challenge nonprofits face in raising money for overhead and other expenses
that are necessary but not exciting to donors. 81 Of course, it may be that taxpayers will not feel
this way. For example, they might feel even better about the residual because the choice-based
payment has reminded them of programs they support.
Second, when money is allocated by individuals operating independently, this sort of
decentralized process can have costs as well as benefits. On the positive side, charities are freer
to experiment and innovate, as Burton Weisbrod has emphasized, because they do not depend on
the support of the median voter; for this reason, the civil rights, women’s rights,
environmentalism, and gay rights were championed first by nonprofits before they were pursued
by government. 82 In addition, individuals are likely to be closer to grass roots organizations, and
correspondingly less susceptible to the interest group influence than elected representatives,
since they cannot be swayed by campaign contributions. 83 Yet on the other hand, we may worry
that taxpayers will allocate money based on inexpert judgments and imperfect information, so
that the results will diverge, in unfortunate ways, from the choices Congress would (or at least
should) make. For example, taxpayers will make their individual choices without complete
information about what others are choosing. 84 A particular goal is likely to be less appealing to
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taxpayers if they know that it already has adequate funding – but it is not easy to provide them
with this information at the moment when they are making their choice, at least if taxpayers are
all making their selections at essentially the same time. 85 Likewise, we might unleash a blizzard
of public lobbying as interest groups seek to persuade taxpayers to support their category of
spending. Of course, this issue is less likely to arise if taxpayers are permitted to allocate only to
a broadly defined category (e.g., “support our troops” or “education”), as opposed to more
specific initiatives.
Third, by framing taxes as more like charitable contributions, we might increase the risk
that support for the government would crowd out private charity. Studies show that such crowd
out has been limited. 86 It is possible that this result could change if taxpayers begin playing a
more active role in allocating their payments to the government, although the opposite is also
possible; for instance, such a program could encourage taxpayers to develop more of a taste for
charitable giving. 87
Fourth, allowing taxpayers a role in allocating payments to the government diminishes
the role of our elected representatives. For example, would we also allow taxpayers to opt out of
supporting programs they oppose, as conscientious objectors sometimes strive to do? 88
Depending on how the mechanism for taxpayer choice is structured, it could strike some
taxpayers as illegitimate, and might even undercut their willingness to pay taxes.
Fifth, if taxpayers are allowed enough discretion to specify in some detail how their
money is spent, there is a risk of self-dealing and interest group capture. For example, we would
not want the owner of a defense contractor to specify that her taxes will be spent purchasing
weapons systems from her company. Again, though, this risk is mitigated if she can choose only
from a menu of very general items (e.g., “support our troops”).
Finally, if government resources are allocated by those who provide them, wealthy
citizens are likely to allocate more. This gives them more personal influence on the overall
85
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allocation than low income taxpayers; 89 indeed, the 47% who do not pay any income tax will not
be accorded this opportunity, at least if the program is for allocating taxes they otherwise have to
pay. 90 This issue is not unique to an individualized decisionmaking process of this sort, of
course, since wealthy people tend to have more influence over elected representatives as well.
But it is worth considering how we can mitigate this effect. One response is to cap the amount
that taxpayers can allocate. But the downside of this approach is that it means less money for the
government (if it governs voluntary payments) or a less meaningful choice for high income
taxpayers (if it governs mandatory payments) since the dollar amount is likely to represent a
smaller percentage of their overall income. This alternative would be more consonant with
egalitarian norms, but less effective at promoting prosocial utility among high income taxpayers.
To sum up, then, allowing taxpayers a role in allocating their payments to the government has
both benefits and costs. The precise tradeoff depends on the details of how such an initiative is
implemented, so we turn now to two different variations. The first involves extra payments
made voluntarily, which are above and beyond what the taxpayer owes in taxes. The second
involves the mandatory tax liability itself.
B. Allocating Voluntary Payments
By encouraging taxpayers to make extra contributions to support government initiatives –
in addition to what they otherwise owe in taxes – we would attract additional resources for the
government, develop information about what taxpayers like to support, and generate warm glow
that might also apply to the mandatory tax payment itself, since taxpayers would be reminded of
government programs they value and thus, hopefully, would feel correspondingly more willing
to pay their (mandatory) taxes as well.
In seeking voluntary contributions, the government would in effect function as a charity.
As a result, this strategy involves the same normative considerations inherent in charitable
support, including the satisfaction donors feel in supporting initiatives they value, the benefits
and costs of decentralized decisionmaking, the potential to crowd out contributions to other
charities, and the disproportionate influence of wealthy donors. 91
Perhaps the most important difference between letting taxpayers allocate voluntary
payments and letting them allocate mandatory ones is that the former undercuts the role of
elected representatives somewhat less than the latter. If payments are made voluntarily, the
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government would otherwise not have attracted these resources. As a result, elected
representatives would not have had the opportunity to allocate this amount anyway (although, if
the payment is tax deductible, they could have allocated a portion of it). 92
2. Fundraising Through Affiliated Nonprofits
As for the mechanics of how the government could raise this money, one option is for the
government to use separate 501(c)(3) organizations. This already occurs, to a degree. For
example, organizations such as the Army Relief Society, the Air Force Aid Society, the
American Veterans Center, and the Disabled Veterans Charitable Trust raise millions of dollars
to provide extra services to military personnel on active duty as well as veterans. 93 The military
is just one of many contexts for this sort of initiative. Local businesses make voluntary
contributions to “business improvement districts,” which provide extra services not offered by
local governments. Private fundraising for State Universities and local public schools are, of
course, another example. For instance, donorchoose.org is a website in which public school
teachers solicit funds for particular projects: Since 2001, 180,000 projects have been funded.
Annual giving has increased from $1 million in 2001 to 27 million in 2010.94
Although these nonprofits have been incorporated as part of a government initiative, they
generally are legally separate from the government. They have their own employees, boards of
directors, programmatic activities, and fundraising initiatives. As a result, they can and should
offer taxpayers the same ability to choose what they want to support as other charities, along
with the same recognition (such as naming rights and award dinners), access to leaders of the
charity, financial incentives such as matching grants (and the tax deductibility of charitable
contributions), and the like. We believe this approach should be used more broadly as a way to
inspire taxpayers to support programs they especially value.
In doing so, we should be particularly vigilant about the risk of corruption. A payment to
an affiliated nonprofit might be a disguised method of buying influence from government
officials. For example, veteran congressman Charles Rangel was censured in part because he
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improperly solicited corporate donations for a college center bearing his name. 95 Although every
charity must deal with the risk that a contribution is meant as a quid pro quo – for instance, when
hospital donors seek special care – the risk for government-affiliated nonprofits is potentially
greater, to the extent that donors expect special access to government officials.
2. Supplemental Tax Payments Directly to the Government
Taxpayers can be invited not only to contribute to affiliated nonprofits, but also to make
extra payments – beyond what they owe in taxes – directly to the government. In effect,
taxpayers would make a charitable contribution to the government. This can be an outlet for
taxpayers who are willing to pay higher taxes than are required by law. For example, Warren
Buffett has publicly urged Congress to raise tax rates on the wealthiest Americans. It would be
good for the country – and perhaps also fulfilling for him – if he decides to make an extra
contribution beyond what is legally required.
There are a number of precedents for inviting extra financial support for the government,
and some have been more successful than others. During World War II, over 85 million
Americans purchased War bonds offering below-market interest. 96 All fifty states have “adopt-ahighway” programs, in which individuals or businesses volunteer to clean or pay for the upkeep
of a designated stretch of highway and are credited for doing so with a sign. 97 Massachusetts
offers taxpayers the option of paying a higher state income tax rate, although only a fraction of
taxpayers choose to do this. 98 Forty-one states offer the opportunity to make contributions to
particular funds on their tax returns, and the states raised $38 million in 2008 through this
initiative. 99 Likewise, the Federal Government has kept a general account since 1843 for “gifts
to the United States.” 100 In 1961 it began offering the option of making gifts specifically to
reduce the national debt, attracting $3 million in 2009. 101
To make this sort of initiative more successful, the government should model its efforts
more explicitly on nonprofit fundraising in three ways. First, since taxpayers have
heterogeneous preference, they are more likely to contribute voluntarily if they can choose what
program they will support.
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Second, the government can offer a matching program so that, by making an extra
payment, taxpayers can become entitled to allocate the matching funds too. Indeed, such a
match effectively is already in place. Extra payments to the federal government are treated as
deductible charitable contributions under current law. 102
Third, those who contribute should be recognized publicly for doing so (unless they
request anonymity). For example, people who give at a minimum amount to a particular
program can be included on a list of donors posted on a website. Tiers can be offered so that
more generous donors are offered special recognition. If it is administratively feasible to do so,
they should also be given details about how their money was used. For instance, just as donors
to financial aid at a university are given information about the student they are supporting,
taxpayers who chose to support our troops can be given the name of the soldier who is being
funded by their contributions.
Although nonprofits also raise money by giving donors unique access to the nonprofit’s
leaders, this strategy obviously would not be appropriate for the government. Unfortunately,
campaign contributors tend to receive this sort of access – a regrettable byproduct of our
campaign finance laws – and we view this as a necessary evil to be minimized. The government
should not sell access in return for voluntary tax payments. Relatedly, there will have to be rules
against quid pro quos and self-dealing (e.g., “approve my merger and I will contribute to your
agency” or “I will contribute money if you use it to buy goods and services from my business”).
C. Allocating Mandatory Tax Payments
In addition to letting taxpayers allocate voluntary contributions to the government, we
also can let taxpayers allocate a portion of the taxes they are legally obligated to pay. This idea
may sound outlandish at first blush, but it bears some resemblance to the “checkoff” system
under current law in which taxpayers choose whether to contribute tax dollars to federal
campaign funds. In addition, Hungary implemented such a system in 1996, allowing taxpayers
to allocate one percent of their tax bill to the nonprofit of their choice, which has proved to be
quite popular among taxpayers. 103
By giving taxpayers some control over how their tax dollars are spent, we can help
generate warm glow for the portion they allocate and, possibly, for the rest as well, since we
would focus taxpayer attention on initiatives they value. On this dimension, allocating
mandatory payments might be even more compelling than allocating voluntary ones. At the
same time, we can generate information about what taxpayers value, as discussed above.
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In our view, however, allowing taxpayers to allocate mandatory payments is harder than
allowing them to allocate voluntary ones. We are more wary of empowering individuals to
allocate funds that otherwise would have been allocated by our elected representatives, and of
giving wealthy individuals a disproportionate voice in the process, as discussed above.
In light of these potential costs, reasonable minds can disagree about whether it makes
sense to offer taxpayers an ability to allocate their tax dollars and, if so, how much discretion to
give them. 104 The farthest we would go is to offer taxpayers choices that are constrained, so that
the overall result is unlikely to diverge much – or, alternatively, is hard-wired not to diverge at
all – from allocations that Congress would otherwise have provided. In other words, the effect
of these allocations would be more symbolic than substantive.
There are three ways to constrain taxpayer choice in this way. First, the policy categories
which taxpayers are invited to select can be defined broadly. If taxpayers are invited to allocate
money to “social welfare programs,” that is a much larger category – which is harder to overfund
– than if they are invited to allocate money to a narrower category such as “support for autistic
children in Rhode Island.”
Second, limiting the amount that taxpayers can allocate to a small percentage of their tax
bill also reduces this risk. For example, if taxpayers can allocate only one percent of their tax
bill, the potential change in the budget process is capped at one percent. Indeed, there would be
no change if taxpayers were invited to allocate 1% of their taxes to categories that each
represented more than one percent of the budget. Of course, taxpayers will have less of a “real”
say in the allocation of the budget, but there is still value in reminding them that their taxes fund
programs they support, and in letting them signal their preferences to Congress.
Third, the government can leave itself some flexibility to modify the allocations made by
taxpayers. The government might commit only to “use best efforts” to allocate taxpayer dollars
to the programs they choose. Or alternatively, if taxpayers allocate more to a particular program
than Congress believes is appropriate, the excess can be carried over to the following year. To
104
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avoid a second year of overfunding, the government can either inform taxpayers of how much
has been carried forward from the prior year – information that presumably will discourage
taxpayers in the second year from directing funds to this program – or the government can take
the more extreme step of deleting the option from the menu in the second year. The more the
government leaves itself room to override taxpayer choices, though, the less meaningful those
choices will seem to taxpayers.
A downside of constraining taxpayer choice, then, is that taxpayers might not take the
choice as seriously. While unsophisticated taxpayers may not fully understand the ways in
which their choices are limited – since the fungibility of money is not obvious to everyone –
sophisticated taxpayers will realize that their choices have only symbolic impact. It would be a
mistake to hide this fact, since the government would lose credibility when this reality eventually
comes to light.
Yet even so, symbolism matters. As we have emphasized, this choice should remind
taxpayers of government programs they value, and this heightened awareness might positively
influence their view even of the taxes that they are not permitted to allocate. In addition,
taxpayers could value the choice as a way to signal their preferences. This information could
itself have influence, as noted above, so that taxpayers will feel more involved and invested in
the process.

IV.

Conclusion

We have argued that taxpayers who support the way their tax dollars are spent are more
likely to comply voluntarily and less likely to change their behavior to avoid tax. Although we
cannot prove this proposition, we show its plausibility by offering direct evidence from a
literature involving experiments, as well as the economics and psychology literature on prosocial
behavior. Likewise, philanthropy is a “real world” analogy, since charitable donors contribute
money voluntarily -- totaling 2% of the U.S. GDP – largely because they are committed to the
charity’s goals.
Our claim has a number of institutional implications. The government should publicize
popular uses of tax dollars, while making particular efforts to root out waste. The government
should also rely more heavily on user fees, as well as on taxes, such as the social security tax and
lotteries for education, which commit revenue to specific (popular) spending programs. We also
develop a new justification for subsidiarity – the idea that services should be provided by the
lowest level of government competent to do so – on the theory that taxpayers will feel more
closely tied to the activities of a lower level of government and more reluctant to free ride within
a homogenous local community. In addition, audits and penalties should be modified to
encourage prosocial behavior. The government also should solicit voluntary contributions from

taxpayers for initiatives they especially value, and may also want to allow taxpayers to allocate
some of their tax bill, though only in a limited way.

